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OFF-CAMPUS CYBERBULLYING: FIRST AMENDMENT
PROBLEMS, PARAMETERS, AND PROPOSAL
David R. Hostetler, J.D.*
To a certain extent, law must forever be subject to
uncertainty and doubt; not from the obscurity and fluctuation
of decisions . . . but from the endless complexity and variety of
human actions . . . [T]here will remain immeasurable
uncertainties in the law, which will call for the exercise of
professional talents, and the grave judgments of courts of
justice.
– U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story (1779–1845)1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Bullying pervades our nation’s schools.2 Too many students
suffer too much, too often, driving some to suicide. The bullying
problem is being increasingly exposed, researched, quantified,
debated, written about, and legislated against. However, courts
have been slow to weigh in and help shape the law to adapt to
this growing reality. A recent federal court opinion describes
one view of the problem:
The typical victim of bullying is more anxious and insecure
than her peers. . . . Bullying brings with it a whole host
of . . . issues. It impairs concentration and leads to poorer
* The author is an Associate Professor in education law, ethics, and policy at
Appalachian State University in Boone, North Carolina and is a licensed North
Carolina attorney specializing in education and school technology law. He is a graduate
of Duke University School of Law (J.D.), Duke University Graduate School (M.A. in
Political Science), Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary (M.A.T.S.) and Westminster
College (B.A.). He may be contacted at hostetlerdr@appstate.edu. The author would
like to thank Adam Parker, Carla Hermida, and Adam Hopler for their research and
editing assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 70−71
(William W. Story ed. 1852).
2 See generally, RACHEL DINKES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS &
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2009,
(2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010012.pdf (providing nationwide
statistics relating to cyberbullying, including related deaths and instances of non-fatal
student and teacher victimization).
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academic performance. Additionally, victims are more likely
to engage in antisocial behavior, have increased health
problems, and struggle to adjust emotionally.
....
The end of school does not bring an end to the damage done
by years of harassment. As a result of this trapped setting,
where harassment is a repeated occurrence, victims carry
lasting emotional and psychological scars into adulthood.3

In this article, “bullying,” is used broadly as shorthand for
any communication that is not a true threat of physical harm,
but instead goes only so far as to offend, demean, ridicule,
embarrass, harass, or intimidate others.4 Cases involving true
threats of harm are not included in the term’s use or
substantially addressed herein. Courts have clearly held that
such threats, if substantiated by evidence, are not protected
speech or, at a minimum, courts have allowed school
administrators to take protective and/or disciplinary action
without much legal difficulty.5
Cyberbullying is a type of bullying that occurs in electronic
forums. It exponentially expands bullying opportunities, the
number of victims, and the legal risks. This expansion is
primarily attributable to electronic media’s ease of use,
accessibility, anonymity, speed, breadth of distribution, and
capacity to be easily recorded, stored, and redistributed.
Cyberbullying can threaten victims’ educational wellbeing both
on and off campus because of its debilitating emotional, social,
3 T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 304−05 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(citations omitted). This case also cited a study that found those who were bullied for at
least three years in grades six through nine had higher rates of depressive symptoms
and lower self-esteem when they were twenty-three years old. Id. at 305.
4 In reality, there are technically and legally significant differences among
various forms and degrees of offensive speech. These include: (1) speech that is
bothersome or offensive (e.g., mean, disparaging, lewd); (2) harassing (frequently
offensive, ridiculing, obstructive, and often based on a person’s individual traits); (3)
bullying (physically, socially, or otherwise threatening speech often by someone in a
position of physical, electronic or other form of one-sided control); or (4) threatening
(physical, reputational, or social). Where such distinctions are required herein they will
be noted.
5 A more recent example is Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 11-17127,
2013 WL 4566354, (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2013) (student’s threatening instant messages
conveyed a clear threat of harm and substantial disruption due to specific statements
that he had access to guns that he intended to use against specific students on a
specific day—the anniversary of the Columbine shootings, thus warranting a 90-day
expulsion.).

Hostetler Macro.docx (Do Not Delete)

1]

OFF-CAMPUS CYBERBULLYING

3/3/14 2:03 PM

3

and other consequences. Nevertheless, few courts have
addressed the legally complicated problem of off-campus
cyberbullying. The extent, therefore, to which schools can
effectively address this problem without running afoul of First
Amendment free speech rights is unclear.6
As far back as 1969, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, the Supreme Court recognized the
“collision” of students’ free speech rights and school safety.7
This collision of rights has resulted in treatment by the courts
that is often inconsistent and confusing. Today, students are
seldom without personal electronic devices that provide
constant access to each other’s speech, and new avenues from
which to reach large audiences associated with their schools.
Previously, a student was only able to shout from his isolated
“soapbox” to those within physical earshot. Now, the same
student’s speech is amplified considerably, as he or she may
tweet, blog, or post repeatedly, quickly, cheaply, and
anonymously to anyone with an Internet connection, including
the targets of cyberbullying attacks. Given today’s cacophony of
electronic speech (“e-speech”), what is a school official to do?
This article aims to clarify the law surrounding
cyberbullying, to provide recommendations on how to address
the problem, and to point out where legal uncertainties
preclude definitive answers. To simplify the analysis of
permissible actions rectifying the effects of cyberbullying, this
article proposes a marriage of the Supreme Court’s “substantial
disruption” standard in Tinker and the “educational
deprivation” standard found in Title IX. This approach is
preferable to the current disjointed approach for three reasons.
First, the educational deprivation standard has an element of
predictability. Second, the standard comports with the explicit
acknowledgement in Tinker of a school’s responsibility to
protect its students. Third, use of this commonly applied
standard would lead to a uniform approach among courts when
hearing cases regarding cyberbullying, rather than the widely
6 Legally, cyberbullying is multi-dimensional, involving an extensive array of
state and federal legal claims and principles. These claims include defamation,
invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, cyberstalking, and other electronicrelated criminal laws. These are not substantially addressed herein due to space and
topic limitations.
7 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507−08 (1969).
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diverging standards that exist today under interpretations of
First Amendment cases.
The following analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I
provides an overview of Supreme Court precedents relating to
student speech in schools and their development over time.
Part II provides summaries revealing the difficulties lower
courts have found in applying the traditional student speech
cases in the cyberbullying and online speech contexts. Part III
discusses the “educational deprivation” standard of Title IX,
provides additional cases where it has been applied, and
provides an analytical protocol based on a merging of the
“substantial disruption” standard found in Tinker and its
progeny with the “educational deprivation” standard found in
Title IX. This article concludes by considering the practical
implications of merging the “substantial deprivation” standard
with the “substantial disruption” standard.
II.

SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS: TINKER, BETHEL,
HAZELWOOD, AND MORSE

To date, the United States Supreme Court has not
substantively opined on a case involving off-campus student espeech. Consequently, its 1969 opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines
remains the seminal student free speech decision in today’s
vastly different environment. In Tinker, students had planned
a protest of the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to
school.8 Fearing that the armbands might incite conflict and
disruption, school administrators created a policy prohibiting
protesting behavior.9 When students violated the ban, school
administrators suspended them.10 The Court upheld the
students’ right to wear the armbands.11 In support of its
decision, the Court reasoned that the political expression
involved did not “materially or substantially disrupt” school
operations, nor did it create a reasonably foreseeable threat of
doing so.12 The Court held that the administrators only had an

8
9
10
11
12

Id. at 504.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 513−14.
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“undifferentiated fear”13 of a potential disruption:
There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’
interference, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or a
collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be
let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or
action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights
of other students.14

The Court expounded on the Tinker standard in the 1986
case, Bethel School District v. Fraser, where the Court upheld a
short-term suspension of a high school student who gave a lewd
campaign speech at a student assembly on behalf of a friend
running for class president.15 In support of its holding, the
Court declared that the suspension was reasonably justified
because the school had a legitimate role in promoting
fundamental civic values and socially acceptable behavior, as
well as in protecting other students from offensive
communications.16
Furthermore, in 1988, the Court upheld a high school
principal’s decision to retract student-written articles for a
school newspaper that discussed teen pregnancy and divorce
within the school community in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.17 The Court held that the principal had the
discretion to censor such speech because the newspaper was
tied to the official school curriculum and invoked pedagogical
concerns,18 since the article about pregnancy would have
revealed sensitive personal information,19 and because both
retracted articles might have given the false impression that
the school endorsed the articles.20
Finally, in 2007, the Court upheld a high school student’s
suspension for violating a school policy prohibiting the
promotion of illegal drug use in Morse v. Frederick.21 Morse and
his friends raised a 14-foot banner that declared, “BONG HiTS

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Id. at 508.
Id. (emphasis added).
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
Id. at 681–83.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273−74 (1988).
Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 271.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
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4 JESUS” during a school-organized event at which students
gathered along both sides of the street in front of the school to
watch the Olympic Torch Relay pass by.22 The Court
determined that the principal could reasonably interpret the
banner as promoting illegal drug use.23 Thus, the Court held
that the principal acted reasonably in taking down the banner
and suspending the student.24 The Court reasoned that schools
have an important role in protecting students from drugrelated influences, especially in times of prevalent illegal drug
use.25
Currently, Tinker and its progeny offer the primary basis
(“substantial disruption”) for determining the constitutionality
of schools restricting or disciplining students for their offcampus, personal speech. Cyberbullying, however, poses a far
more difficult legal challenge than the physical, on-campus
speech issues faced in Tinker. As one court aptly stated, “the
advent of the Internet has complicated analysis of restrictions
on speech. . . . Indeed, Tinker’s simple armband, worn silently
and brought into a Des Moines, Iowa classroom, has been
replaced by . . . complex multi-media web site[s], accessible to
fellow students, teachers, and the world.”26
Particularly important for this article is Tinker’s less-cited
recognition of the “rights of other students to be secure and to
be let alone.”27 A review of lower court decisions applying
Tinker to off-campus cyberspeech reveals that courts, more
often than not, uphold student speech rights for offensive offcampus cyberspeech directed at students or staff (e.g., graphic,
lewd, and demeaning speech) if schools are unable to show or
reasonably forecast a substantial disruption at school. These
points are addressed more specifically in Part III.

Id. at 397.
Id. at 401.
24 Id. at 408.
25 Id.
26 J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863−64 (Pa. 2002)
(citations omitted).
27 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
22
23
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III. CONFUSING AND CONFLICTING LOWER COURT
CYBERBULLYING DECISIONS
A.

Tinker and J.C.’s Off-Campus “Rant” Video

Particularly instructive is a 2010 California federal district
court case, J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School
District.28 J.C., a high school student, videotaped a
conversation with her friends at a restaurant after school.29
The four-and-a-half minute video contained profane, crude, and
derogatory comments about a thirteen-year-old fellow student
(referred to as “C.C.”).30 In the video, J.C. and her friends called
C.C. “a slut,” “spoiled,” and “the ugliest piece of shit I’ve ever
seen in my whole life.”31 J.C. encouraged such comments during
the video, telling one friend “to continue with the Carina
rant.”32 Another student was heard asking, “[a]m I the only one
that doesn’t hate Carina?”33
That night, J.C. posted the video on YouTube and told five
to ten other peers, including C.C., to watch it.34 About fifteen
students saw the video that night; webpage data showed
approximately ninety “hits” to the site, including many by
J.C.35 The next day, J.C. claimed she heard ten students at
school talking about the video.36 Unsurprisingly, C.C. was
initially very upset, humiliated, and hurt.37 The morning
following the video post, she missed the beginning of her first
class after spending twenty to thirty minutes with the school
counselor, who eventually persuaded C.C. to attend her class.38
Administrators investigated all morning.39 Several students
talked about the video while at school, but there was no

28 J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D.
Cal. 2010).
29 Id. at 1098.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1108.
34 Id. at 1098.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1098–99.
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evidence that any student accessed it on any school computer.40
By noon, the matter had been fully addressed, according to the
school’s counselor.41 In the litigation, the school presented no
evidence of any lasting impact that C.C. suffered academically
or otherwise as a result of the video.42
The school suspended J.C. and she filed suit.43 She claimed
the school violated her free speech rights, in part, because her
video was protected First Amendment speech, made and posted
off-campus on her own computer, on her own time.44 Following
a comprehensive review of free speech case law across
jurisdictions,45 the court applied Tinker’s substantial disruption
standard and analyzed the free speech claim.46 The trial judge
identified three major issues: First, whether the video
substantially disrupted the school.47 Second, whether it was
reasonably likely to cause a future substantial disruption.48
Lastly, whether the video interfered with the rights of other
students.49
First, the judge found no evidence of any substantial
disruption.50 Its analysis, in this regard, is an important
reminder to school officials and attorneys that “substantial
disruption” is a qualitative standard that requires evidence of
significant one-time or cumulative impact, not just that some
impact has occurred.51 The court further clarified the
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1117−18.
Id. at 1118–19.
Id. at 1097, 1099.
Id. at 1100.
Id. at 1100–17.
Id. at 1117–23.
Id. at 1117–19.
Id. at 1119–22.
Id. at 1122–23.
Id. at 1117.
Specifically, the court held:

For the Tinker [substantial disruption] test to have any reasonable limits, the
word “substantial” must equate to something more than the ordinary personality
conflicts among middle school students that may leave one student feeling hurt or
insecure. Likewise, the Court finds that the mere fact that a handful of students
are pulled out of class for a few hours at most, without more, cannot be sufficient.
Tinker establishes that a material and substantial disruption is one that affects
“the work of the school” or “school activities” in general . . . . Thus, while the
precise scope of the substantial disruption test is still being sketched by lower
courts, where discipline is based on actual disruption (as opposed to a fear of
pending disruption), the School’s decision must be anchored in something greater
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contextual dimensions of disruption findings, stating:
The substantial disruption inquiry is highly fact-intensive.
Perhaps for that reason, existing case law has not provided
clear guidelines as to when a substantial disruption is
reasonably foreseeable. There is, for example, no magic
number of students or classrooms that must be affected by the
speech. One court has held that a substantial disruption
requires something more than “a mild distraction or curiosity
created by the speech” but need not rise to the level of
“complete chaos.” . . . Not surprisingly, however, the gulf
between those two concepts swallows the vast majority of
factual scenarios. Further complicating matters is the fact
that the Court has not uncovered any cases, in this Circuit or
otherwise, that address speech targeted at a particular
student, as is the case here.52

Secondly, the judge concluded that there was no evidence of
a reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption.53 If “a school
can point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—
especially one based on past incidents arising out of similar
speech—the restriction may pass constitutional muster.”54
Judge Wilson noted, instead, that the principal had only a
speculative, unsubstantiated fear of disruption and that the
impact on C.C. was not substantially harmful.55
J.C.’s video was not violent or threatening. There was no
reason for the School to believe that C.C.’s safety was in
jeopardy or that any student would try to harm C.C. as a
result of the video. Certainly, C.C. never testified that she
feared any type of physical attack as a result of the video.
Instead, C.C. felt embarrassed, her feelings were hurt, and she
temporarily did not want to go to class. These concerns cannot,
without more, warrant school discipline. The Court does not
take issue with Defendants’ argument that young students
often say hurtful things to each other, and that students with
limited maturity may have emotional conflicts over even
minor comments. However, to allow the School to cast this
than one individual student’s difficult day (or hour) on campus. Id. at 1119
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 514 and J.S.
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 852).
52

J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d

omitted).
53
54
55

Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1117–1119.

at 1111 (emphasis added) (citations
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wide a net and suspend a student simply because another
student takes offense to her speech, without any evidence that
such speech caused a substantial disruption of the school’s
activities, runs afoul of Tinker.56

Lastly, Judge Wilson observed that Tinker recognized
schools’ authority to restrict speech that “impinge[s] upon the
rights of other students,” even if the disruption is not
foreseeable.57 However, the extent to which this may be the
case remains unclear and was not relevant to this case.58
Underlying the court’s determinations described above was the
fact that there was insufficient evidence presented by the
Defendants of any actual or reasonably foreseeable substantial
disruption or threat to the rights of others.59 Had they been
able to present more specific evidence of a substantial impact to
the school and/or on C.C., their likelihood of prevailing would
have increased accordingly.60 This offers a pointed lesson to
school officials when investigating similar situations and to
attorneys gathering and presenting evidence to a court.
B.

Other Individual Impact Cases and Tinker’s “Rights of
Others” Prong

In light of existing case law, the question remains whether
and to what extent schools may restrict cyberspeech when that
speech: is expressed off-campus; does not enter the campus or
transform itself into “on-campus” speech (subject to Bethel or
Id. at 1117 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1122 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 509 (1969)).
58 J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23 (noting that “the Court is not
aware of any authority . . . that extends the Tinker rights of others prong so far as to
hold that a school may regulate any speech that may cause some emotional harm to a
student. This Court declines to be the first”).
59 Id. at 1121 (“A comparison of this case to the record in LaVine helps illustrate
the Defendants’ evidentiary shortcomings.”) (citing Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257
F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001)).
60 Judge Wilson also noted that some courts have required an additional
showing that the student who generated the speech could reasonably foresee that the
speech would reach the campus. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. The judge
concluded that J.C. could reasonably foresee that her video would “make its way to
campus.” Id. at 1108. She posted it on the Internet for the public to see, and
deliberately contacted other students that night, including C.C., urging them to view
the video on YouTube. Id. Furthermore, J.C. made no efforts to guard against the video
making its way onto campus. Id. at 1109. Without deciding whether this prong was in
fact a requirement, Judge Wilson held it was satisfied regardless.
56
57

Hostetler Macro.docx (Do Not Delete)

1]

OFF-CAMPUS CYBERBULLYING

3/3/14 2:03 PM

11

Morse standards); does not cause and is not reasonably likely to
cause substantial disruption to school operations; does not
cause or threaten physical harm, but does reasonably threaten
one individual’s or group’s educational well-being.
Presently, there is limited case law that clearly addresses
this narrow question.61 It is reasonable to predict that some
courts may allow schools to restrict such speech under Tinker’s
“substantial disruption” and/or its “rights of others” prongs.
Some courts may merge the two prongs: speech that invades
the “rights of others” is a “substantial disruption.” Other courts
may distinguish the two prongs: speech that does not
substantially disrupt (generally) may still invade the rights of
others.62 There are several cases hinting at these possibilities.
A case that roughly matches the above criteria was decided
in July 2011 by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools.63 Kara Kowalski, a high
school student, created a MySpace discussion group page called
“S.A.S.H.” which, according to Kowalski, stood for “Students
Against Sluts Herpes,” although another student testified that
it stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes” (referring to the
specific
student
victim,
Shay).64
Kowalski
invited
approximately a hundred people on her “friends” list to join the
group, of which about two-dozen of Kowlaski’s classmates
responded.65 One student submitted several derogatory
postings about Shay, including images of her with red dots
imprinted on her face to simulate herpes and a sign near her
pelvic area indicating, “Warning: Enter at your own risk.”66
Within hours of posting, Shay’s father contacted the student

61 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 1027, 1094 (2008) (“As of this writing, no court has invoked Tinker’s rights-ofothers prong as the sole basis for upholding restriction on student speech in the digital
media.”).
62 It is also conceivable that a court may apply Morse on the basis of protecting
student safety. This seems unlikely given that Court’s explicit directions that its
holding applied narrowly to the facts of that case. Furthermore, the Court treated the
matter as “on-campus” expression, unlike the scenario presented above.
63 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011).
64 Id. at 567.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 567–68. In a second photograph, one student posted an image of Shay,
captioning her face with a sign stating “portrait of a whore.” Id. at 568. Most other
postings focused on Shay N. Numerous student comments celebrated the derogatory
page and/or were eager for Shay N. to see it.
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who posted the images and Kowalski to express his anger and
to ask for the removal of the page. However, Kowalski was
unable to delete the webpage and remove the photos.67 Shay
and her parents met with school officials the next day and filed
a harassment complaint pursuant to the school’s bullying and
harassment policy.68 Shay then returned home for the
remainder of the day due to the discomfort of attending classes
with the same students who made these incendiary remarks on
the MySpace page.69
Ultimately, the school board suspended Kowalski for five
days (reduced from ten days), imposed a ninety-day “social
suspension” precluding her from attending any school events in
which she was not a direct participant, and banned her from
the cheerleading squad for the remainder of the year.70
Kowalski sued officials and the school system asserting, among
other things, a First Amendment free speech claim, contending
that the MySpace group was purely off-campus private speech
not subject to the school’s jurisdiction.71 The trial court ruled in
favor of the defendants on summary judgment.72 Applying a
unique analysis, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling in favor
of the defendants.73 Notably, the court applied Tinker’s
substantial disruption and “rights of others” standards,
appearing to conjoin them.74 In applying the standard, the
court relied on numerous generalized assumptions about the
disruptive effects of the “verbal attacks” and “defamatory
accusations” on Shay N. and the school.75 The court was
particularly dismissive of off- and on-campus boundaries that

Id. at 568.
Id. at 568−69.
69 See id. at 568.
70 Id. at 568–69.
71 Id. at 567.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 577.
74 See id. at 572–73. The court held that Kowalski’s MySpace page, by
interfering with Shay N.’s educational rights and wellbeing, substantially disrupted
the school’s “work and discipline of the school.” Id. Specifically, the court stated,
67
68

[w]e are confident that Kowalski’s speech caused the interference and disruption
described in Tinker . . . This is not the conduct and speech that our educational
system is required to tolerate, as schools attempt to educate students about
“habits and manners of civility” or the “fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system.” Id.
75

Id.
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have dictated the outcome of most other courts in favor of
plaintiffs:
This [off-campus speech] argument . . . raises the
metaphysical question of where her speech occurred when she
used the Internet as the medium. Kowalski indeed pushed
her computer’s keys in her home, but she knew that the
electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published
beyond her home and could reasonably be expected to reach
the school or impact the school environment. She also knew
that the dialogue would and did take place among Musselman
High School students whom she invited to join the “S.A.S.H.”
group and that the fallout from her conduct and the speech
within the group would be felt in the school itself.
....
[R]egardless of where her speech originated, . . . the speech
was materially and substantially disruptive in that it
“interfer[ed] . . . with the schools’ work [and] colli[ded] with
the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”76

The court also cited several indicators of actual disruption:
the fact that Shay N. missed a day of school to avoid further
abuse and that her parents considered the MySpace comments
as “school-related” leading them to file their complaint.77 The
court assumed, without evidence, the reasonable foreseeability
of other disruptions:
[H]ad the school not intervened, the potential for continuing
and more serious harassment of Shay N. as well as other
students was real. Experience suggests that unpunished
misbehavior can have a snowballing effect, in some cases
resulting in “copycat” efforts by other students or in
retaliation for the initial harassment.
....
To be sure, it was foreseeable in this case that Kowalski’s
conduct would reach the school via computers, smartphones,
and other electronic devices, given that most of the “S.A.S.H.”
group’s members and the target of the group’s harassment
were Musselman High School students.78

The Fourth Circuit’s analysis is arguably not in the judicial
76
77
78

Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
Id. at 573–74.
Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
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mainstream due to its highly speculative and conclusory
determinations about the effect (real or potential) of Kowalski’s
MySpace page on Shay N. and the school. Whereas most court
opinions79 require specific and compelling evidence or the
likelihood of substantial disruption, the Fourth Circuit in
Kowalski seemed satisfied with what it considered common
sense assumptions, and less concerned with concrete evidence
of actual and foreseeable effects.80
In the 2006 case of Harper v. Poway Unified School
District,81 the Ninth Circuit upheld a student suspension after
the student wore a t-shirt to school condemning homosexuality
during a “day of silence” that was intended to promote
tolerance of gay students.82 The court determined that the
shirt’s message was a “verbal assault” based on one of three
core-identifying characteristics (i.e., race, religion, and sexual
orientation), and was therefore “harmful” speech to
“particularly vulnerable” students.83
The court explicitly chose not to apply Tinker’s “substantial
disruption” prong and, instead, applied its “rights of others”
prong.84 In doing so, it made several significant declarations.
For example, the “rights” prong applies not just to deprivations
of legal rights, but also to soft rights, such as the right to “be
left alone” and to privacy against “unwanted communication,”

See supra Part III.A.
There are many of these conclusory remarks through the opinion. For
example, “[Kowalski’s and other students’] conduct was indisputably harassing and
bullying, in violation of Musselman High School’s regulations prohibiting such
conduct.” Kowalski, 652 F.3d 565, at 572 (emphasis added). In another example, the
court states, “We are confident that Kowalski’s speech caused the interference and
disruption described in Tinker . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Even more evidence of this
“common sense” approach is indicated in the court’s acknowledgment that “[Kowalski]
knew that the electronic response . . . could reasonably be expected to reach the school
. . . and that the fallout from her conduct . . . would be felt in the school itself.” Id. at
572 (emphasis added).
81 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as
moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007).
82 Id. at 1171. While this case carries no precedential value (see Bowler v. Town
of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 179 (D. Mass. 2007)), it still carries persuasive value.
See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28172, at *20–*21
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007). The case also demonstrates how a court may choose to apply
Tinker’s “rights of others” prong as a separate standard form Tinker’s “substantial
disruption” standard.
83 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1182.
84 Id. at 1183–84.
79
80
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particularly for “persons [who] are ‘powerless to avoid’ it.”85 For
instance, the Harper court stated that
[t]here is nothing in Tinker that remotely supports the
dissent’s contention that the rights to “be secure and to be let
alone” are limited to rights such as those that protect against
“assault, defamation, invasion of privacy, extortion and
blackmail.” Security and privacy entail far more than freedom
from those torts [i.e., legal rights]. Nor does the dissent offer
any reason why the rights to security and privacy do not
include freedom from verbal assaults that cause psychological
injury to young people.86

The court identified “psychological health and well-being
[as well as] educational development” as protected rights.87 The
court further noted some of the related tangible indicators and
consequences, including the risk of and decline in academic
failure, difficulty concentrating, fear for one’s safety, feelings of
isolation, truancy, and dropping out of school.88 Remarkably,
the court assumed all or many of these “deprivations” occurred
based simply on “self-evident” notions and “common sense,”
without citing any evidence: “you don’t need an expert witness
to figure out the self-evident effect of certain policies or
messages.”89 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and conclusions
extend Tinker’s “rights of others” prong very broadly and
uniquely. To what extent other circuits are likely to follow suit
is unclear.90
85 Id. at 1178; contra id. at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (disputing the
majority’s position that if the speech was directed at non-minority individuals, the
analysis would require the more difficult substantial disruption standard, not the
“rights of others” standard applied in this case for protecting gay students). Judge
Kozinski further explained that “[t]he ‘rights of others’ language in Tinker can only
refer to traditional rights, such as those against assault, defamation, invasion of
privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose interplay with the First Amendment is well
established.” Id. at 1198. Konzinski further states that “[s]urely, this language is not
meant to give state legislatures [via additional civil protections] the power to define the
First Amendment rights of students out of existence by giving others the right not to
hear that speech.” Id.
86 Id. at 1178 n.18 (citation omitted).
87 Id. at 1179.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1180 (quoting dissenting Judge Kozinski’s own language from a prior
Ninth Circuit decision).
90 This problem is made plain by Judge Kozinksi in dissent:

I find this a difficult and troubling case . . . On the record to date, the school
authorities have offered no lawful justification for its actions . . . . It is entirely a
judicial creation, hatched to deal with the situation before us, but likely to cause
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Several cases show that some courts will uphold
disciplinary actions under Tinker’s “substantial disruption”
standard based largely on the impact the Internet speech has
on the targeted individual.91 One such example is found in J.S.
v. Bethlehem Area School District,92 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court upheld a fourteen-year-old’s expulsion for posting a
“Teacher Sux” website.93 The site contained “derogatory,
profane, offensive, and threatening comments,” primarily about
the student’s algebra teacher and his principal.94 One page
began, “Why Should She Die?” (referring to the teacher) and
invited readers to “give me $20 to help pay for the hit man.”95
That page also included images of the teacher being
decapitated (with blood dripping from her neck) and morphing
into Adolph Hitler.96
The teacher consequently became ill and suffered
sleeplessness, stress, anxiety, and loss of weight, causing her to
take a medical leave of absence for the rest of the school year.
This required replacing her with three different substitute
teachers.97 The evidence showed that J.S., at least once, opened
the website on a school computer and showed a classmate and
that other students and staff became aware of the site as well.98
The principal testified that morale at the school was “worse
than anything he had witnessed” in his forty-year professional
innumerable problems in the future. Id. at 1192, 1200.
91 For example, in a 2008 California case, a court denied a student’s request for
a preliminary injunction, thus allowing a school to suspend a student for posting a
YouTube video dramatizing the murder of her teacher. O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach
Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-5671 ODW (AJWx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110409 at
*1−*2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008). Key factors were the school’s duty to “protect the
teacher and address safety concerns” and the impact on the teacher who “feared for her
safety and became physically ill.” Id. at *9–*10 (also noting, “it would appear
reasonable, given the violent language and unusual photos depicted in the slide show,
for school officials to forecast substantial disruption of school activities.”).
92 J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
93 Id. at 869 (Also, the summary of this and other cases in this section are
quoted and adapted from a prior publication by the author. See David Hostetler, School
Cyberlaw Part I: Cyberspeech: First Amendment and Defamation, 34 SCH. L. BULL. 4
(2003), available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/slb/slbfal03/article1.pdf).
94 Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 851.
95 Id.
96 Id. Further, some pages urged the teacher’s dismissal because of her looks
and personality and also referred to her as a “bitch” or “stupid bitch” and associated
her with a picture of a witch. Id.
97 Id. at 852.
98 Id. at 851–52.
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career, comparing its effect to the death of a student or staff
member.99
In this instance, the court determined that the speech came
“onto campus” because J.S. opened the webpage in one
instance, as
did
other
students.100 Following
this
determination, the court had to decide how to apply Tinker
(substantial disruption) and Bethel (lewd on-campus speech).101
Relying mostly on Tinker, the court ruled that the web site
substantially disrupted the school community, especially
because of its effect on J.S.’s algebra teacher:
[I]n this day and age where school violence is becoming more
commonplace, school officials are justified in taking threats
against faculty and students seriously . . . .102

Further examples are found in the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, which issued two separate but related en banc
opinions in June 2011. Each addressed virtually identical facts
involving separate school systems: students suspended for 10
days for posting lewd and derogatory MySpace parody profiles
of their respective principals.103 In Layshock v. Hermitage
School District,104 the circuit court upheld the trial court’s
Id. at 853.
Id. at 865.
101 Id. at 669.
102 Id.
103 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc);
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219, n.1 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(Jordan, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]his case and J.S. [v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.]
are not related cases in the sense of being linked on our docket, but they raise nearly
identical First Amendment issues. It is no accident that they were taken en banc at the
same time, were argued on the same date, and are being decided simultaneously.”).
104 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (2011). The
MySpace profile at issue in the case was especially disturbing. The court noted:
99

100

It all began when Justin Layshock used his grandmother’s computer to access
[MySpace] where he created a fake internet “profile” of his Hickory High School
principal . . . . Justin created “bogus answers” to the site’s survey questions,
applying a theme of “big” because the principal was, apparently, a large man.
Some of these answers included numerous self-designating and demeaning
statements: “big steroid freak,” smoking a “big blunt” (marijuana), “big pills,”
“skinny dipping,” getting drunk a “big number of times,” “big whore,” and “big fag.”
Layshock listed the principal’s “Interests” as “Transgender, Appreciators [sic] of
Alcoholic Beverages.”
News of the site “spread like wildfire” at the school. Some students, including the
principal’s daughter, alerted the principal to the site’s existence. After
investigating, the principal determined the profile to be “degrading,” “demeaning,”
“demoralizing,” and “shocking.” Though the principal expressed interest in
pressing criminal charges, none were ever filed. The school system eventually
suspended Justin for ten days and imposed other discipline.104 Id. at 205−10.
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ruling in favor of Layshock.105 The school district did not
dispute that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the
off-campus profile caused a substantial disruption.106 The court
rejected the district’s argument that the profile entered the
campus to become “on-campus” speech; i.e., the personal
MySpace profile was “on-campus” speech because the student
opened the site on a school computer to show classmates, and
the student copied a picture of the principal from the school
webpage to create the fake profile.”107 Justin Layshock opened
the site one time on a school computer to show classmates108
and also copied a picture of the principal from the school
webpage to paste into the page.109 The court stated, “we do not
think that the First Amendment can tolerate the School
District stretching its authority into Justin’s grandmother’s
home and reaching Justin while he is sitting at her computer
after school in order to punish him for the expressive conduct
that he engaged in there.”110
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District111 was the companion
case decided by the Third Circuit en banc panel. It too involved
a derogatory MySpace parody about the school principal.112 The
profile was initially available to the public, but J.S. made the
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

Id. at 207.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 207–08.
Id. at 216.
J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).
The court noted:

The profile contained crude content and vulgar language, ranging from nonsense
and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at the
principal and his family. For instance, the profile lists M-Hoe’s [the principal’s]
general interests as: “detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain [apparently
referring to his relationship with his wife], spending time with my child (who looks
like a gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking in my office, hitting on students
and their parents.” [Citation omitted.] In addition, the profile stated in the “About
me” section:
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. it’s your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless,
sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] I have
come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other principal’s [sic] to be just
like me. I know, I know, you’re all thrilled[.] Another reason I came to
myspace is because - I am keeping an eye on you students (who[m] I care for
so much)[.] For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t in my school[,] I
love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick
head, and last but not least my darling wife who looks like a man (who
satisfies my needs ) MY FRAINTRAIN. Id. at 921.
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site private the next day so that only “invited” friends could
view it.113 Although numerous students saw the profile, nobody
considered the content to be true, or suspected the principal of
any of the alleged activities.114 The principal, after
investigating, threatened criminal action against J.S. and her
parents, had law enforcement officials summon them to
headquarters for questioning, and got MySpace to remove the
profile.115
The court began its analysis by recognizing the
“comprehensive,” though “not boundless,” authority of teachers
and other public school officials on school premises.116
Reviewing the law, the court characterized Tinker as the
“general rule” in117 student school speech cases, with Fraser,
Hazelwood, and Morse being the “exceptions” to the rule (i.e.,
for regulating speech not otherwise substantially disruptive).118
Based on this characterization of the law, it found J.S.’s
MySpace parody only caused some disruption at the school.119
For example, administrators spent time investigating and had
to alter some meetings.120 Additionally, teachers had to quiet
students down in classrooms.121 The court viewed these as only
minor disruptions.122 It also determined that the speech was
not subject to Fraser’s “lewd speech” analysis because the
speech stayed off-campus,123 except for a printed hardcopy
requested and reviewed by the principal.124
The court applied Tinker’s “the rights of others” prong in a
footnote that is important to this article’s consideration of the
relationship between “substantial disruption” and individual
impact at school:
The School District seizes upon language in Tinker that is
arguably dicta, claiming that it was justified in abridging
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

Id.
Id.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 925–926.
Id. at 929−30.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 928−29.
Id. at 929.
Id.
Id. at 930.
See id. at 937–38.
Id. at 932.
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J.S.’s First Amendment rights because the profile defamed
[the principal]. In Tinker, the Court [also] discussed its
concern with “the rights of other students to be let alone.” As
a result, the Court appeared to indicate that school officials
could stop conduct that would “impinge upon the rights of
other students.” Later in the opinion, the Court reiterated the
point, but referred simply to “invasion of the rights of others.”
Although [the principal] is not a student, the School District
claims J.S’s speech is not immunized by the First Amendment
because [the principal’s] right to be free from defamation fits
within this language in Tinker. We are not aware of any
decisions analyzing whether this language applies to anyone
other than “students,” but we do note that our cases have
employed both of these clauses. We further note there is a
danger in accepting the School District’s argument: if that
portion of Tinker is broadly construed, an assertion of
virtually any “rights” could transcend and eviscerate the
protections of the First Amendment. In any event, we agree
with J.S. that, as a matter of law, [the principal] could not
succeed in his claim that the profile violated his right to be
free from defamation.125

The court, in other words, implied that if Tinker’s “rights of
others” prong is valid and applies, it must involve a formal
legal right only.126 Here, the court concluded that the principal
had not been defamed: the content was so patently outrageous
and could not be taken seriously.127 It remains to be seen if
courts in other jurisdictions agree that Tinker’s “individual
rights” prong is more than mere dicta and, if so, whether those
courts will apply the “individual rights” standard as rigidly as
the J.S. court did by limiting its application to formal legal
rights.
Some courts have not specifically considered Tinker’s
“individual rights” prong, even when an individual has been
negatively affected. In such instances, courts have rejected
speech restrictions and discipline for minor offensiveness or
discomfort. Examples include a principal upset by an offensive
and vulgar student website criticizing him and the school;128
125

J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (2011), at 931 n.9 (citations

omitted).
126
127
128

Id.
Id. at 928.
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
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two teachers upset by a student’s offensive and lewd “top ten”
lists about them, causing one to have “a hard time doing his
job” and another to “almost come to tears;”129 a school antiharassment policy ruled to be overbroad by precluding all
offensive speech;130 and student placards with a website
address, which directed users to a site that contained graphic
images of terrorist beheadings.131 These provide support for the
notion that the individual harm must be extensive for speech to
be considered substantially disruptive to an individual.
IV. PROPOSAL TO MERGE TITLE IX’S “EDUCATIONAL
DEPRIVATION” AND TINKER’S “SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION”
STANDARDS
The above discussion exposes at least two difficult and
unanswered legal questions: whether bullying’s harmful effects
on an individual’s or group’s educational rights may suffice as a
basis for discipline under Tinker, and if so, how should these
rights be measured and proved? As the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has succinctly stated, “[t]here is no constitutional right
to be a bully” on campus.132 Similarly there is no right to harass
another student on campus; Titles VI and IX provide such
safeguards relating to race and gender based discrimination.133
However, the Third Circuit court noted that a school’s efforts to
prohibit harassment might also conflict with student free
speech rights under Tinker when such harassment includes
offensive, disparaging speech that involves religious or political

129 Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001)
(“Disliking or being upset by the content of a student’s speech is not an acceptable
justification for limiting student speech under Tinker.”).
130 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.)
(“[T]he mere fact that someone might take offense at the content of speech is not
sufficient justification for prohibiting it.”).
131 Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2007) (noting that
school officials’ concerns about the potential of students’ psychological reaction and
need for “counseling to cope with their subsequent feelings of helplessness and despair”
were too vague and unspecific).
132 Sypniewski v. Warren Hill Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir.
2002).
133 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2012). Although both Title IV
and Title IX involve similar protections and analyses, this Article refers only to Title IX
as shorthand for both and because it seems that cases involving the issue of off-campus
conduct affecting individual educational deprivation arise primarily under Title IX.
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content.”134 The Third Circuit summarizes the law as follows:
Although mere offense is not a justification for suppression of
speech, schools are generally permitted to step in and protect
students from abuse [on campus]. Even where harassment by
name calling does not involve a racial component, and even
where there is no special history of disruption, prohibition
accompanied by the threat of sanction is—and has always
been—a standard school response. Students cannot hide
behind the First Amendment to protect their “right” to abuse
and intimidate other students at school. Outside the school
context, of course, much harassment by name calling
(understood broadly) is protected. But the First Amendment
does not interfere with basic school discipline.135

This article suggests that the most predictable and logical
legal standard for proving an actual or reasonably foreseeable
substantial disruption based on individual or group educational
impact can be found in Title IX of the 1972 Educational
Amendments,
which
protects
against
gender-based
discrimination, including harassment and hostile environment
claims.136 Title IX claims are guided, in part, by the Supreme
Court’s 1999 opinion in Davis v. Monroe.137 Accordingly,
proving a Title IX violation by a school requires evidence that a
student has been subject to conduct “so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access
to an educational opportunity or benefit” (referred to herein as
the “educational deprivation” standard).138 This test includes
both a subjective element as well as an objective element. The
plaintiff must show a subjective belief the conduct was so
offensive that he or she could not have obtained his or her
education, and the plaintiff must also show that an objective
person would have experienced the same form of

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
136 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006); see also T.K. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ.,
779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 314 (E.D. N.Y. 2011) (distinguishing from the statute because the
case involved on-campus bullying of a special education student). The court in T.K.
considered whether the existence of bullying could be proof that a school failed to
provide a Free Appropriate Public Education under the Individual with Disabilities
Education Act, while providing an extensive review of federal case law. T.K., 779 F.
Supp. 2d at 309–19.
137 Davis v. Monroe, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
138 Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
134
135
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discrimination.139 When read in pari materia140 with the
standards that have evolved from Tinker, a well-defined
standard is created that will prove useful to practitioners,
parents, and pupils. Further, at least one federal district court
has acknowledged that “general principles of anti-harassment
law may be relevant” to the Tinker analysis.141 Also, Judge
Kozinski, in his dissent in Harper, acknowledges that
“[h]arassment law might be reconcilable with the First
Amendment, if it is limited to situations where the speech is so
severe and pervasive as to be tantamount to [disruptive]
conduct.”142
In addition to these admittedly limited judicial references,
there are several reasons justifying the use of Title IX’s
“educational deprivation” standard. First, is well-established
and somewhat predictable. Second, it comports well with
Tinker’s acknowledgment of schools’ responsibilities to protect
students’ individual rights; i.e., student access to educational
opportunities and benefits. Third, common sense seems to
dictate simplicity and uniformity by using an already
established and more predictable legal standard (rather than
creating another standard or doing nothing to clarify existing
confusion).
We can, at this time, only guess if and how courts would
apply a merged standard to off-campus cyberspeech. That is,
how will courts determine whether off-campus cyberbullying
has impeded a victimized individual or group from enjoying
educational benefits on campus? There already exists
established extensive precedent for applying Title IX
protections in cases involving educational deprivations caused
by off-campus behavior.143 This is best exemplified in the
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 862 (9th ed. 2009) (defined as a “canon of
construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed together, so that
inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the
same subject.”). Naturally, the approach is one that suggests conflating a standard of
jurisprudence that has evolved in interpreting Titles VI and IX with a speech standard
for off-campus cyberspeech, but it is a standard that nonetheless would prove helpful in
the absence of clarity from the United States Supreme Court regarding the subject.
141 Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. Of Educ., No. 01-3061, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25388, *62 n.13 (D.N.J. 2001).
142 Harper, 445 F.3d 1166, at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
143 See Crandell v. New York Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316
n.126 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th
139
140
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Supreme Court’s 1998 Title IX ruling in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Indep. Sch. Dist.,144 which involved a teacher and student who
were engaged in a sexual relationship that occurred extensively
off-campus.145 An oft-used test146 emerged from the case;
namely, to prove that an educational deprivation occurred, the
party must show that (1) a school district official, with the
ability to implement corrective measures, knew of the
inappropriate conduct; and (2) that despite having knowledge
of the inappropriate conduct, the educational entity
deliberately failed to respond properly.147
A.

What’s good for Title IX ought to be good for Tinker.

Tinker’s analysis should be extended to off-campus speech
affecting on-campus individual educational opportunities. It is
suggested here that Title IX’s “educational deprivation”
standard be applied across the board to all instances of offcampus cyberbullying, not just to instances involving genderbased harassment.148 Resorting to this approach would be
necessary only if the speech could not be restricted otherwise
under any already-established First Amendment bases (i.e.,
under Tinker—regarding substantial disruption to school
operations, Bethel, Morse, etc.). Thus, if the off-campus
cyberbullying effectively denies, or is likely to deny, the victim
his or her on-campus educational benefits (under the Title IX
Cir. 1997) (upholding Title IX claims where all sexual contact occurred off school
property), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 524 U.S. 274 (1998)); Doe v. Claiborne
County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding claim where some incidents of
misconduct took place off campus) rev’d in part on other grounds by Gebser v. Lago
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (according to Phillips v. Anderson County
Bd. of Educ., No. 3:06-CV-35, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92120, at *33 n.5 (E.D. Tenn.
2006)); Warren v. Reading Sch. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Doe v. School
Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Maine 1999) (upholding claim where all
misconduct occurred off campus); Donovan v. Mount Ida College, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23048 (D. Mass. Jan 3, 1997) (some incidents of misconduct occurred off
campus); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1296−97 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (all misconduct occurred off campus).
144 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
145 Id. at 278.
146 See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 701 (4th Cir. 2007).
147 Id. at 290–92.
148 However, it is worth noting that when there are off-campus activities which
do result in a form of gender discrimination that satisfy the requirements of Lago
Vista, the school will be required to respond and take prompt action to end the hostile
environment caused by the sexual harassment.
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standard), this presumably meets Tinker’s “substantial
disruption” test. Alternatively, a court may choose to apply
Tinker’s “individual rights” prong if it does not consider it
dicta.
Applying this standard to two of the aforementioned cases,
J.C. and Kowalski, would likely improve the predictability of
their results. In J.C., the judge noted that the plaintiff would
have failed at least one of the elements of the Title IX test,
namely the objective analysis: “J.C.’s video was not violent or
threatening. There was no reason for the School to believe that
C.C.’s safety was in jeopardy or that any student would try to
harm C.C. as a result of the video.”149 Kowalski proves a
tougher case, despite similar facts, as it used a somewhat
speculative analysis and eschewed more widely adopted rules
concerning off-campus speech.150 Under a Title IX analysis, the
Kowalski court would have more pronounced standards for oncampus and off-campus regulation of speech to rely upon, and
would be bound by the Davis subjective and objective test when
determining whether regulation of a student’s off-campus
speech was proper.
V. CONCLUSION
School officials, attorneys, and the lower courts need
greater clarity in knowing how to balance student safety,
effective school operations, and student free speech rights.
Bullying victims, most of all, need protection and freedom from
cyberbullying. All who have a role and interest in the dangers
and problems of cyberbullying will be well served if the
Supreme Court, someday soon, provides us with greater legal
clarity. Until then, this article argues that the Title IX
“educational deprivation” standard conjoined with Tinker’s
“substantial disruption” test provides a useful, common sense,
and legally sound basis to resolve some of the ambiguities and
uncertainty in this area of the law.
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150

J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
See supra notes 71–80 and accompanying text.

